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This paper o¤ers an alternative explanation for the behavior of postwar US in‡ation by
measuring a novel source of monetary policy time-inconsistency due to Cukierman (2002).
In the presence of asymmetric preferences, the monetary authorities end up generating a
systematic in‡ation bias through the private sector expectations of a larger policy response
in recessions than in booms. Reduced-form estimates of US monetary policy rules indicate
that while the in‡ation target declines from the pre- to the post-Volcker regime, the average
in‡ation bias, which is about one percent before 1979, tends to disappear over the last two
decades. This result can be rationalized in terms of the preference on output stabilization,
which is found to be large and asymmetric in the former but not in the latter period.
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11 Introduction
The behavior of postwar US in‡ation is characterized by two major episodes. The …rst is an
initial rise that extends from the 1960s through the early 1980s. The second is a subsequent
fall that lasts from the early 1980s to the present day. The important change that underlies
such a path can be exempli…ed by the average rates reported in the second column of Table 1.
In‡ation ismeasuredastheannualizedquarterly increaseinthelog GDP chain-typepriceindex
whereas theoutput gap is constructed as the log deviation of real GDP from theCongressional
Budget O¢ce potential output. The di¤erence of the average in‡ation rates across the two
sub-samples is above 2% and it is echoed by the decline in the volatility of the output gap
displayed in the third column.
While a more favorable macroeconomicenvironment and a better policy management dur-
ing the last two decades or a persistent error in the real-time estimates of potential output
during the 1970s arealso likely to have played a role, an important strand of theliterature has
investigated whether the time-consistency problem can explain the behavior of US in‡ation.
In a stimulating contribution, Ireland (1999) shows that Barro and Gordon’s (1983) model
oftime-consistent monetary policy imposeslong-run restrictionson thetimeseriespropertiesof
in‡ation and unemployment that arenot rejected by thedata. In theabsenceofa commitment
technology, the monetary authorities face an incentive to surprise in‡ation in an e¤ort to
achieve a lower level of unemployment through an expectations-augmented Phillips curve.
However, such an optimal plan is not time-consistent in the sense of Kydland and Prescott
(1977), and privateagents, who rationally understand such a temptation, adjust their decisions
accordingly. In equilibrium, unemployment is still at its…rst-best level but therate ofin‡ation
is ine¢ciently higher than it would otherwise be. This is the celebrated in‡ation bias result,
according to which the higher the natural rate of unemployment the more severe the time-
consistency problem of monetary policy is.
As Persson and Tabellini (1999) make clear, the central bankers’ ambition of attaining a
level of unemployment below the natural rate is crucial to generate the kind of in‡ation bias
2a la Barro and Gordon (1983), and both researchers and policy makers have challenged such
an assumption on the ground of realism. McCallum (1997) argues that were this the case,
the monetary authorities would learn by practicing the time-inconsistency of their actions and
eventually would revise their objective. Describing his experience as vice-Chairman, Blinder
(1998) claims that the Fed actually targets thenatural rate of real activity, thereby suggesting
that overambitious policy makers cannot be at the root of any kind of in‡ation bias. While
this may rationalize the failure of the theory to account for the short-run in‡ation dynamics
(see Ireland, 1999), it does not necessarily imply that the time-consistency problem has been
unimportant in the recent history of US monetary policy.
In an intriguing article, Ruge-Murcia (2003) constructs a model of asymmetric central
bank preferences that nests the Barro-Gordon model as a special case. When applied to the
full postwarperiod, the hypothesisthat theFed targetsa level ofreal activity di¤erent from the
natural rate is rejected but the hypothesis that it weights more severely output contractions
than output expansions is not. This suggests the existence of a novel average in‡ation bias
that according to Cukierman (2002) comes from the private sector expectations of a more
vigorous policy response in recessions than in booms.
Speci…cally, the average in‡ation bias is a function of both the preferences of the central
bank and the volatility of the output gap. To the extent that a signi…cant policy regime
shift has occurred at the beginning of the 1980s after the appointment of Paul Volcker as
Fed Chairman, it is likely that the degree of asymmetry and therefore the degree of time-
inconsistency has also changed during the last four decades. Hence, rather than focusing on
the full postwar period like Ireland (1999) and Ruge-Murcia (2003), we study the sub-samples
that are typically associated with a shift in the conduct of US monetary policy according
to the reasoning that the time-inconsistency problem and the relative in‡ation bias are best
interpreted as regime-speci…c. The di¤erence in the sub-sample volatility of the output gap
shown in the third column of Table 1 also seems consistent with this view.
This paper contributes to the literature on optimal monetary policy by proposing a mea-
sure oftheaverage in‡ation biasthat arises in a model ofasymmetriccentral bank preferences.
3To this end, it is developed a novel identi…cation strategy that allows to recover the relevant
parameters in the central bank objective function and, most importantly, to translate them
into a measure of time-inconsistency. The comparison between the commitment and the dis-
cretionary solutions shows how the observed in‡ation mean can be successfully decomposed
into a target and a bias argument, a result that to our knowledge of the existing literature
comes as new. Reduced-form estimates of US monetary policy rules indicate that a signi…cant
regime shift has occurred during the last forty years as measured by the change in the Fed
policy preferences. In particular, while the in‡ation target declines from 3:42% to 1:96%, the
average in‡ation bias, which is estimated at 1:01% before 1979, is found to disappear over the
last two decades. The result can be rationalized in terms of the policy preference on output
stabilization, which is found to belarge and asymmetric in the pre- but not in thepost-Volcker
period.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and solves for the optimal
monetary policy. Section 3 derives its reduced-form version and reports the estimates of both
the feedback rule coe¢cients and the average in‡ation bias. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Following the literature, the private sector behavior is characterized by an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve:
yt =µ(¼t ¡¼e
t) +ut, µ >0 (1)
where yt is the output gap measured as the di¤erence between actual and potential output,
¼t denotes in‡ation and ¼e
t stands for the expectations on the in‡ation rate in period t from
the standpoint of period t¡1. The supply disturbance, ut, obeys a potentially autoregressive
process ut =½ut¡1 +"t where ½ 2 [0; 1) and "t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance
¾2
". The private sector has rational expectations
¼e
t = Et¡1¼t (2)
with Et¡1 being the expectation conditional upon the information available at time t¡1.
4Potential output is identi…ed with the real GDP trend so that the mean of the output gap
is normalized to zero. Moreover, yt is also a random variable as it depends on ut, and its
variance, which is a positive function of both ½ and ¾2
", is denoted by ¾2
y.
As customary in the literature, the central bank is assumed to have full and direct control







where ± is thediscount factorand Lt stands for theperiod loss function. Thelatter is speci…ed

















where ¸ >0 and ° represent therelative weight and the asymmetric preference on output sta-
bilization, respectively. The in‡ation target, ¼¤, is assumed stable enough to be approximated
by a positive constant that possibly di¤ers across sub-samples. Unlike in the Barro-Gordon
model, the target level of output is not meant to overambitiously exceed potential. This is
consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Ruge-Murcia (2003).
The objective function (4) departures from the quadratic form in that policy makers are
allowed, but not required, to treat di¤erently output contractions and output expansions.
Indeed, under a cubic speci…cation deviations ofthe same size but opposite sign yield di¤erent
losses and a negative value of ° implies that negative output gaps are weighted more severely
than positive ones. To see this notice that whenever yt < 0 the cubic term, °y3
t, is positive
and ampli…es the penalty due to the quadratic component whereas for yt > 0 the quadratic
and the cubic terms move in opposite directions.
Thecubicform neststhequadraticspeci…cation as a special caseandwhenever° is equal to
zero thecentral bank objectivefunction (4) reducestotheconventional symmetricparametriza-







. This feature is attractive as it allows us to test whether the
relevant preference parameter is statistically di¤erent from zero. Figure 1 compares the stan-
dard quadratic with the asymmetric cubic function using the historical values of the output
5gap and a value of ° that is consistent with the estimates reported below.1
Thespeci…cation of an asymmetricloss with respect to theoutput gap only is motivated by
empirical as well as theoretical considerations. At the empirical level, Surico (2003b) derives
a general, nonlinear interest rate rule within a model of nonquadratic preferences over both
in‡ation and output, and …nds evidence of an asymmetric objective for the latter but not for
the former variable. At the theoretical level, Geraats (1999) shows that the labor market ‡ows
overthebusinesscycleprovidea natural microfoundation for anasymmetricwelfarecriterion as
the …rms’ hiring-…ring decisions aremainly taken along the extensive margin during recessions
but along the intensive margin during booms.
2.1 Commitment
This subsection solvesfortheoptimal monetary policy undercommitment. Becauseno endoge-
nous state variable enters the model, the intertemporal policy problem reduces to a sequence
of static optimization problems. Accordingly, the monetary authorities, who can manipulate
in‡ation expectations, choose both planned in‡ation, ¼t, and expected in‡ation, ¼e
t, to mini-
mize the asymmetric loss function (4) subject to the augmented Phillips curve (1) and to the
additional constraint (2) imposed by the rational expectations hypothesis. The corresponding
























+¹ = 0 (6)
with ¹ being the Lagrange multiplier associated to the rational expectation constraint. Com-
bining the optimality conditions (5) and (6) to eliminate ¹, and taking expectations of the
resulting expression produce
E(¼t) = ¼¤ (7)
1The cubic speci…cation can also be interpreted as some third-order approximation around (¼t ¡¼
¤) = 0 and
yt = 0 to the linex function proposed by Nobay and Peel (2003), and employed by Geraats (1999), Ruge-Murcia
(2003) and Surico (2003a). The advantage of using the cubic form as the primitive function is that it does not
require any approximation of the optimal monetary policy rule. Nevertheless, for a realistic range of values of
yt like [¡0:08; 0:06], and given the estimates of ° reported below, the cubic and the linex function behave very
similarly.
6where wehaveused the law ofiterated expectations to get rid of Et¡1. Equation(7) statesthat
the planned in‡ation rate equals on average the socially desirable in‡ation rate and therefore
it is independent of the output gap.
2.2 Discretion
If commitment is infeasible, the monetary authorities choose the in‡ation rate ¼t at the be-
ginning of the period after the private agents have formed their expectations but before the











It isinstructiveat thispoint tocomparethesolutionobtainedunderasymmetricpreferences
with the solution obtained under the standard quadratic case. Whenever ° = 0, the optimal
monetary policy becomes
(¼t ¡¼¤) =¡¸µEt¡1 (yt) (9)
This implies that under quadratic preferences there exists a one to one mapping between the
in‡ation bias and the output gap conditional mean. Moreover, in the face of white noise
supply disturbances (i.e. ½ = 0) the in‡ation bias is zero re‡ecting the notion of potential
output targeting.
To compute the average in‡ation bias, we take expectations of equation (8), and using the
fact that the unconditional mean of theoutput gap is zero, we obtain the following expression:





The comparison between the expected rates under commitment (7) and under discretion
(10) illustratesthesourceofanovel average in‡ation bias. LikeintheBarro-Gordonmodel, the
time-inconsistency of monetary policy arises here because the policy makers face an incentive
to surprisein‡ation. However, thenatureoftheincentivein thetwo models isvery di¤erent. In
Barro-Gordon (1983) this is the central bank desire to push the economy beyond its potential
level. Here, it is the asymmetric concern about the business cycle that associates a more
7aggressivepolicy responseto output contractionsthan tooutput expansions(i.e. ° < 0). Asthe
private sector correctly anticipates such an incentive, the in‡ation rate systematically exceeds
the …rst-best solution attainable under commitment even though the monetary authorities
target output to potential. Moreover, the bias is higher the larger and the more asymmetric
the policy preference on output stabilization is.
Possible improvements to the discretionary solution include the appointment of a more
conservative central banker, who is one endowed with a lower relative weight ¸ in the spirit
of Rogo¤ (1985) and/or a lower in‡ation target than society, or the appointment of a more
symmetric policy maker, who is one endowed with a smaller absolute value of °. Lastly, the
average in‡ation bias is proportional to thevariance of the output gap as the marginal bene…t
ofan in‡ation surpriseis convex in the output gap. When ° isequal to zero as it is in equation
(9), such a marginal bene…t becomes linear and the average in‡ation bias disappears together
with the precautionary motive. This feature parallels the precautionary motive result in the
theory of consumption according to which non-quadratic preferences and labor income risks
generate above-average saving rates in periods of high uncertainty.
3 The evidence
This section investigates the empirical merits of the asymmetric preference model to account
for the behavior of postwar US in‡ation. The analysis spans the period 1960:1-2002:3 and
it is conducted on quarterly, seasonally adjusted data that have been obtained in February
2003 from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. In‡ation is measured as the
annualized changein the log oftheGDP chain-weighted price index, whereasthe output gap is
constructed as the di¤erence between the log of the real GDP and the log of the real potential
output provided by the Congressional Budget O¢ce.
To make our results comparable with those reported by Ruge-Murcia (2003), we …rst con-
sider the whole sample. Then, we use our identi…cation strategy to estimate the asymmetric
preference and to obtain a measureof the in‡ation bias for both the pre- and the post-Volcker
regimes. We also address the issue of sub-sample stability by re-estimating the model over
8Greenspan’s tenure, which begins in the third quarter of 1987. Indeed, equation (10) makes it
clear that the in‡ation biasis a function of policy makers’ preferencesand thereforeit can only
be interpreted as regime-speci…c. To the extent that a signi…cant break has occurred in the
conduct of US monetary policy during the last forty years, our identi…cation scheme provides
a sharper evaluation of the model by measuring the time-inconsistency across the two eras.
3.1 Preliminary analysis
As a way to illustrate the potential relevance of the asymmetric preferences induced in‡ation
bias, we consider a testable prediction of the quadratic preference model. According to equa-
tion (9), the conditional mean of the output gap is informative about the di¤erence between
the realized in‡ation and the in‡ation target. Moreover, in the face of i.i.d. supply shocks
the conditional mean and therefore the in‡ation bias should be zero re‡ecting the notion of
quadratic preferences and potential output targeting.
Figure 2 displays the kernel estimates of the output gap conditional mean (with the sign
switched) over the full sample using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator, a second order Gaussian
kernel and the likelihood cross validation procedure to obtain a value for the …xed bandwidth
parameter. The results are una¤ected by using the least squares cross validation criterion
and an higher order kernel. Before proceeding however it is important to stress what we are
not doing in this exercise. In particular, we are not using the output gap as the dependent
variable while estimating the optimality condition (9). Rather, we are computing from the
bivariate time-series model of in‡ation and output the conditional mean of the output gap
which according to the model of quadratic preferences and potential output targeting is the
measure of the in‡ation bias at each point in time.
A couple of interesting results emerge from Figure 2. First, the third quarter of 1982
appears to witness the beginning of a new era as represented by the intersection between the
lower bound of the 95% con…dence interval and the zero line. This is consistent with the
conventional wisdom that a regime-switch in the conduct of US monetary policy has occurred
at the beginning of the 1980s, especially with the end of the so-called ’Volcker experiment’ of
9non-borrowed reserves targeting that Bernanke and Mihov (1998) date in 1982:3. Second, the
measure of the in‡ation bias displays a fairly di¤erent pattern across the two periods moving
from the signi…cant estimates of the 1970s to values that are not statistically di¤erent from
zero during the last two decades. Although also a change in the persistence of the supply
shocks may account for part of the di¤erence, we stress that the nonparametric evidence over
the earliersample rejects a model of quadratic preferences, potential output targeting and i.i.d.
disturbances. Given the popularity of these assumptions in the literature, we interpret this
…nding as a call for an extension of the theory. We return to the identi…cation of asymmetric
preferences versus persistent supply shocks in the discussion of the empirical results.
3.2 The reduced-form
We solve equation (8) for ¼t and prior to estimation we replace expected output gaps with
actual values. The empirical version of the feedback rule is given by:
¼t =¼¤ +®yt +¯y2
t +vt (11)
which is linear in the coe¢cients
®=¡¸µ and ¯ =¡
¸µ°
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The term in curly brackets is a linear combination of forecast errors and therefore vt is orthog-
onal to any variable in the information set available at time t ¡1.
Equation (11) reveals that by assuming an optimizing central bank behavior the reaction
function parameters can only be interpreted as a convolution of the coe¢cients representing
policy makers’ preferencesand those describing thestructureoftheeconomy. Nevertheless, the
reduced-form parameters allow us to identify both the asymmetric preference on the output
gap and the average in‡ation bias. The asymmetric preference is ° = 2¯=® while the bias
amounts to ¯¾2
y. The latter is obtained as the di¤erence between the solution of the central
bank optimization under commitment (7) and the solution under discretion (10).
103.3 Empirical results
To the extent that the penalty associated to an output contraction is larger than the penalty
associated to an output expansion of the same size, the model predicts ° < 0, ®< 0 (since ¸,
µ > 0), and ¯ > 0. Moreover, while also persistent supply shocks imply a signi…cant role for
the level of theoutput gap, only asymmetric preferences are crucial for theprediction that the
squared output gap is helpful to forecast in‡ation.
The orthogonality conditions implied by the rational expectation hypothesis makes the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) a natural candidate to estimate equation (11). This
has also the advantage that no arbitrary restrictions need to be imposed on the information
set that private agents useto form expectations. To control for possible heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation in the error terms we use the optimal weighting scheme in Hansen (1982)
with a four lag Newey-West estimate of the covariance matrix. Three lags of in‡ation, output
gap and squared output gap areused as instruments corresponding to a set of 7 overidentifying
restrictions that can be tested for. The choice of a relatively small number of instruments is
meant to minimize the potential small sample bias that may arise when too many overidenti-
fying restrictions are imposed. We also check the robustness of our results to changes in the
instrument set. In particular, we re-estimate the model using …ve lagsofin‡ation and two lags
of output gap and squared output gap. The F-test applied to the …rst stageregressions, which
Staiger and Stock (1997) argue to beimportant in evaluating therelevanceofthe instruments,
alwaysrejectsthenull ofweak correlation between theendogenous regressors and thevariables
in the instrument sets.
Table 2 reports the estimates of the feedback rule (11) for the full sample. Each row
corresponds to a di¤erent set of instruments. The parameter on the output gap, ®, is not sta-
tistically di¤erent from zero whereasthe parameteron the squared output gap, ¯, is signi…cant
and positive. The estimates of the slope coe¢cients as well as the estimates of the in‡ation
target are robust to the instrument selection and the hypothesis of valid overidentifying re-
strictions is never rejected. These results are similar to those reported by Ruge-Murcia (2003)
11as they con…rm the presence of asymmetric preference using a di¤erent method of estimation
and a di¤erent measure of real activity.
Table 3 reports the estimates for the pre- and post-Volcker regimes. We remove from the
second sub-sample the period 1979:3-1982:3 when the temporary switch in the Fed operating
proceduredocumented by Bernankeand Mihov (1998) appears to beresponsiblefor the failure
to gain control over in‡ation. The sample selection is also consistent with the nonparametric
evidence reported in the preliminary analysis.
The …rst two rows of Table 3 refer to the pre-Volcker era and show large negative values
for the level of the output gap besides to positive and signi…cant parameters for its squared.
The point estimates of the in‡ation target range from 3:42% to 3:69% while the asymmetric
preference parameter is negative and statistically signi…cant. These results sharply contrast
with the post-1979 values that are displayed in the middle rows and the bottom rows of Table
3. Indeed, not only the in‡ation target statistically declines to values around 2%, but also the
impact of the output gap level on in‡ation appears to be weaker, although still signi…cant. To
the extent that the structure of the economy has remained stable during the last forty years,
a smaller value of ® can only be rationalized by a decline in ¸, which corresponds to a more
conservative monetary policy stance. The most dramatic di¤erence between the two regimes
emerges however on the squared output gap, which actually loses explanatory power for both
set of instruments as well as for both post-1979 samples. This translates into values of the
policy parameter ° that are not statistically di¤erent from zero.
Turning to the measure of the asymmetric preference induced time-inconsistency, Table 4
reports the estimates of the average in‡ation bias. According to equation (10), the bias is
a convolution of the structural parameters of the model and the variance of the output gap.
Given the decline in the latter reported in the third column of Table 1, we expect also the
in‡ation bias to declinemoving from the pre- to thepost-Volcker period. This seems consistent
with thechange in the volatility ofthe supply shocksdocumented by Hamilton (1996) between
the 1970s and the 1980s.
The second column of Table 4 shows the measure of the average in‡ation bias implied by
12the reduced-form estimates of Table 3. The …rst block reports the pre-Volcker values whose
point estimates range from 1:01% in the baseline case to 1:36% for the alternative instrument
set. By contrast, the in‡ation bias is found to be not statistically di¤erent from zero over the
post-1979 era, re‡ecting thefact that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear
feedback rule during the former but not during the latter period. Empirical support for this
form of regime shift can also be found in the cross-country evidence over 22 OECD economies
reported by Cukierman and Gerlach (2003).
Lastly, the realized in‡ation mean over the pre-1979 sample falls in the range of estimates
implied by the sum of thein‡ation target and the in‡ation bias whileits post-Volcker counter-
parts appear to behigherthan themodel predicts. Thissuggests that thetheory can e¤ectively
decomposethe observed in‡ation mean into a measure of the target and a measure of the bias
over the pre-1979 regime, though it needs to be extended to account more fully for the gap
that appears in the data over the last two decades.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a method to measure the time-inconsistency of monetary policy when
the preferences of the central bank are asymmetric. As demonstrated by Cukierman (2002),
if policy makers are more concerned about output contractions than output expansions, an
in‡ation bias can emerge on average even though output is targeted at potential. In addition,
both casual observations and formal empirical analyses challenge the predictions of the Barro-
Gordon model by arguing that the Fed’s desired level of output does not exceed the natural
rate (see Blinder, 1998, and Ruge-Murcia, 2003).
Using a model of asymmetric preferences and potential output targeting, it is shown how
the observed in‡ation mean can be successfully decomposed into a target and a bias argument.
When applied to postwar US data, our identi…cation method indicates that the target is 3:42%
and the bias 1:01% during the pre-1979 policy regime. By contrast, over the last two decades
the in‡ation target declines to 1:96% while the average in‡ation bias tends to disappear. This
result can be rationalized by the fact that the policy preference on output stabilization is
13found to be large and asymmetric before but not after the appointment of Paul Volcker as
Fed Chairman. Although other factors such as an inconvenient policy making and unfavorable
supply shocks are also likely to have played a role, this paper provides empirical support and
quantitative measures of a new, additional explanation for the behavior of US in‡ation during
the 1970s.
While suggestive, the results reported in this paper are based on a simple model, and the
speci…cation of a richer structure of the economy is likely to produce also a state-contingent
bias as well as a stabilization bias. However, as shown by Svensson (1997) and Cukierman
(2002), the average in‡ation bias would then belarger than it is with a standard expectations-
augmented Phillips curve. This suggests not only that our estimates are better interpreted as
a lower bound but also that a richer speci…cation of the private agents’ behavior may account
for the gap between the model-based average in‡ation and the actual average in‡ation during
the last two decades. Given our limited knowledge of the channel(s) through which the time-
consistency problem a¤ects policy outcomes, measuring and disentangling the in‡ation bias
remains a challenging topic for future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Sample
Inflation mean Output gap standard
deviation
1960 – 2002 3.78 2.61
1960 – 1982 4.87 3.03
1983 - 2002 2.51 1.98
US quarterly data. Inflation is measured as the changes in the log of the
GDP chain-type price index and the output gap is the difference
between the log of real GDP and the log of the CBO potential output.18
Table 2: Reaction Function and Policy Preference Estimates
- full sample -
Instruments



















Specification:  t t t t v y y + + + =
2 * b a p p
Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in
brackets. Inflation is measured as changes in the GDP chain-type price index and
output gap is obtained from the CBO. The instrument set (1) includes a constant,
three lags of inflation, output gap and squared output gap. The instrument set (2)
includes a constant, five lags of inflation, and two lags of output gap and squared
output gap. F-stat refers to the statistics of the hypothesis testing for weak
instruments relative to output gap and squared output gap, respectively. J(m) refers
to the statistics of Hansen’s test for  m overidentifying restrictions which is
distributed as a c
2(m) under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions.
The superscript ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true
coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.19
Table 3: Reaction Function and Policy Preference Estimates
- sub samples -
Instruments

































































Specification:  t t t t v y y + + + =
2 * b a p p
Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in brackets.
Inflation is measured as changes in the GDP chain-type price index and output gap is obtained
from the CBO. The instrument set (1) includes a constant, three lags of inflation, output gap and
squared output gap. The instrument set (2) includes a constant, five lags of inflation, and two
lags of output gap and squared output gap. F-stat refers to the statistics of the hypothesis testing
for weak instruments relative to output gap and squared output gap, respectively. J(m) refers to
the statistics of Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a c
2(m)
under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote
the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and 10
percent significance levels, respectively.20



























































Standard errors in parenthesis. The instrument set (1) includes a constant, three lags of
inflation, output gap and squared output gap. The instrument set (2) includes a constant, five
lags of inflation, and two lags of output gap and squared output gap. The superscript ** and
* denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent
and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. The inflation bias is computed as 
2
y bs .21
The horizontal axis spans the range of historical values for the CBO output
gap during the sample 1960:1 – 2002:3 while the value of gamma in the
asymmetric specification is consistent with the estimates reported below.
Figure 1: Preferences over Output Stabilization
- cubic vs. quadratic -22
Figure 2: The Evolution of the Inflation Bias over Time
Sample: 1960:1 – 2002:3, US quarterly data. Inflation is measured as the
changes in the log of the GDP chain-type price index and the output gap is the
difference between the log of real GDP and the log of the CBO potential output.
The kernel estimates of the output gap conditional mean on inflation are
obtained using the Nadaraya-Watson method, a second order Gaussian kernel
and the likelihood cross validation procedure to get a value for the fixed
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